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THE USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP BY THE
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY
David L. Schwartzt & Lee Petherbridge Ph.D.tt
ChiefJustice John Roberts recently explained that he does not pay much
attention to law review articles, reportedly stating that they are not particu-
larly helpful for practitioners and judges. Chief Justice Roberts's criticism
echoes that made by other judges, some of whom, likeJudge Harry Edwards,
have been much more strident in the contention that legal scholarship is
largely unhelpful to practitioners and judges. Perhaps inspired by criticisms
like those leveled by ChiefJustice Roberts and Judge Edwards, legal scholars
have sought to investigate the relevance of legal scholarship to courts and
practitioners using a variety of means. One avenue of investigation has
been empirical, where several studies using different and sometimes ambigu-
ous methodologies have observed a decrease in citation to legal scholarship
and interpreted that observation to mean that legal scholarship has lost rele-
vance to courts and practitioners.
The study reported here examines the hypothesis that legal scholarship
has lost relevance to courts. Using empirical techniques and an original
data set that is substantially more comprehensive than those used in previous
studies, it examines citation to legal scholarship by the federal circuit courts
of appeals over the last fifty-nine years. It finds a rather surprising result.
Contrary to the claims of ChiefJustice Roberts and Judge Edwards, and con-
trary to the results of prior studies, this study finds that over the last fifty-
nine years there has been a marked increase in the frequency of citation to
legal scholarship in the reported opinions of the circuit courts of appeals.
Using empirical and theoretical methods, this study also considers explana-
tions for courts' increased use of legal scholarship.
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Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am pleased to be here ... to speak
on the relevance of legal scholarship to the judiciary. I note that whoever
came up with the topic did not add the qualifier "if any," which shows a
commendable degree of confidence.
- Judge Alex Kozinskil
Legal scholarship has been under sharp attack, particularly when
it comes to the role some believe it should play in support of the legal
profession.2 In recent remarks, Chief Justice John Roberts explained
that he does not pay much attention to it, reportedly stating that legal
I Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. REv. 295, 295
(2000).
2 It has garnered criticism for other reasons as well. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The
Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REv. 34, 35
(1992) ("I see no reason why law professors should write mediocre economics, or philoso-
phy, or literary criticism, when arts and sciences professors could be doing a better
job . . . ."); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today, 115 HARV. L, REV. 1314, 1320-21
(2002) (expressing concern over how law review articles differ from the scholarly norm:
"[t] hink only of the length of law review articles, how unembarrassed the legal writer is to
repeat what is well known, how seldom one finds an article that begins with a clear state-
ment of what the author thinks the article adds to the existing literature").
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scholarship is not "particularly helpful for practitioners and judges."3
And Chief Justice Roberts is not alone in his criticism. Judge Harry
Edwards has characterized legal scholarship coming from "elite" law
faculties as "abstract scholarship that has little relevance to concrete
issues, or addresses concrete issues in a wholly theoretical manner"
and offered his impression that 'judges, administrators, legislators,
and practitioners have little use for much of the scholarship . . . pro-
duced by members of the academy."4 Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs of
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has been equally dismis-
sive: "I haven't opened up a law review in years ... . No one speaks of
them. No one relies on them."5
Legal academics, too, have roundly criticized legal scholarship for
being useless to the bench and bar.6 A noted American Bar Associa-
tion study addressing legal education and professional development
stated: "Practitioners tend to view much academic scholarship as in-
creasingly irrelevant to their day-to-day concerns . . . . [M]any practic-
ing lawyers believe law professors are more interested in pursuing
their own intellectual interests than in helping the legal profession
address matters of important current concern."7 A former dean of
Hofstra University School of Law expressed the concern that legal aca-
3 Jess Bravin, ChiefJustice Roberts on Obama, justice Stevens, Law Reviews, More, WALL ST.
J. L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2010, 7:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/07/chief-justice-
roberts-on-obama-justice-stevens-law-reviews-more/; cf Daniel Solove, Chief Justice Roberts
and Legal Scholarship, CONCURRING OPINIONS, (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:26 PM) http://www.
concurringopinions.com/archives/2010/04/chief-justice-roberts-and-legal-scholarship
.html (finding Chief Justice Roberts's view "kind of glib and dismissive").
4 Edwards, supra note 2, at 35.
5 Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, judges Are Finding Law Reviews Irrelevant, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting Chief Judge Dennis G. Jacobs). Other judges have
echoed similar concerns. See, e.g., Thomas L. Ambro, Citing Legal Articles in judicial Opin-
ions: A Sympathetic Antipathy, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 547, 549 (2006) ("When we |judges] do
read the occasional article, we find it often not only unpersuasive, but even at times at odds
with accepted means of analysis."); Judith S. Kaye, One Judges View of Academic Law Review
Writing, 39 J. LEGAL EDUc. 313, 319-20 (1989) ("Prominent law reviews are increasingly
dedicated to abstract, theoretical subjects ... and less and less to practice and professional
issues . . . . I am disappointed not to find more in the law reviews that is of value and
pertinence to our cases."); see also United States v. Six Hundred Thirty-Nine Thousand Five
Hundred & Fifty-Eight Dollars ($639,558) in U.S. Currency, 955 F.2d 712, 722 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (Silberman,J., concurring) ("I suppose, now that many of our law reviews are domi-
nated by rather exotic offerings of increasingly out-of-touch faculty members, the tempta-
tion for judges to write about issues that interest them-whether or not raised by the
parties or constituting part of the logic of the decision-is even greater.").
6 See, e.g., David Hricik & Victoria S. Salzmann, Why There Should Be Fewer Articles Like
This One: Law Professors Should Write More for Legal Decision-Makers and Less for Themselves, 38
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 761, 778 (2005) (claiming that the "trend" toward "'not merely un-
helpful,' but 'useless"' legal scholarship is "already apparent" (citation omitted)).
7 SECTION OF LEGAL EDuc. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL EDUCA-
TION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM: REPORT OF THE




demic scholarship has drifted so far from the interests of the bench
and bar, and has become so insulated, that young legal scholars are
discouraged from publishing traditional doctrinal work.8 In his three-
word The Shortest Article in Law Review History, Professor Erik M. Jensen
included only two footnotes, one of which states:
A reader suggested to me that this article has insufficient legal con-
tent, that "Res ipsa loquitur" (or some other pompously legal slo-
gan) would serve my purposes better. But it's been decades since
law review articles had to have anything to do with the law. For that
matter, it's been a long time since law review articles had to have
anything to do with anything. This article has as much content as
the other stuff in this issue, doesn't it?9
Perhaps animated by these kinds of criticisms, law professors have
shown much interest in how legal scholarship defines the relationship
between the legal academy and the bench and bar. The scholarly
work in this area takes different forms. A significant body of work is
directed to the nature and purposes of legal scholarship.1 0 Another
significant body of work investigates courts' treatment of legal
scholarship.
This second body of scholarship contains at least two lines of in-
vestigation. A first is exemplified by the writings of Judges Edwards,
Thomas Ambro, and Judith Kaye as well as by the MacCrate Report."
It is perhaps best described as making a claim to a felt consensus that
legal scholarship has drifted so far from the interests of the bench and
8 Remarks of Professor Aaron D. Twerski, L'65, MARQ. LAw. (Marquette Univ. Law Sch.,
Milwaukee, Wis.), Spring 2009, at 55, 56 (noting that prestigious law reviews appear less
interested in publishing traditional doctrinal scholarship and that "young scholars [en-
gaged in such scholarship] are justifiably afraid that when tenure time comes around their
articles will be viewed as pedestrian"). Other law professors repeat these concerns. See,
e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 6 (positing that law professors write more for them-
selves and less for decision makers and arguing that law professors should write more for
decision makers and less for themselves). a
9 Erik M. Jensen, The Shortest Article in Law Review History, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 156, 156
& n.1 (2000) (having as its entire text: "This is it").
10 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J.
1113 (1981); Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.
REv. 1835 (1988); Mark Tushnet, Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205
(1981).
11 See MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 7; Ambro, supra note 5; Edwards, supra note 2;
Kaye, supra note 5. This is not to say that all judges dislike legal scholarship. Judge John
Minor Wisdom, for example, told his law clerks: "Do not, however, be so brief that you
neglect to do a thorough job of research, including research of the law reviews. I like a
good article, comment, or note in point-regardless of the source. Do not limit yourself to
Harvard, Yale, Stanford, Chicago, and Michigan reviews." John Minor Wisdom, Wisdom's
Idiosyncrasies, 109 YALE L.J. 1273, 1278 (2000).
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bar that it has no practicable relevance and therefore is best
ignored.' 2
A second line of investigation is empirical. Much of the empirical
work involving courts' treatment of legal scholarship has involved ex-
amining the frequency with which courts cite to it. Perhaps the most
significant studies in this area claim a decline in the frequency with
which courts cite to legal scholarship.13 These studies have the effect,
12 That is not to say that this line of scholarly work is devoid of empiricism. Some of it
derives from observations taken from law review articles (e.g., exemplary articles) and ob-
servations taken from scholarly literature about legal scholarship (e.g., assertions about the
nature and purpose of legal scholarship). That said, this body of work is not generally
quantitative and does not typically develop a statistical description of historical fact.
13 See, e.g., Robert J. Hume, Strategic-Instrument Theory and the Use of Non-Authoritative
Sources by Federal judges: Explaining References to Law Review Articles, 31 JusT. Sys. J. 291, 299
(2010) (reporting that law review citations "have become increasingly less common over
time"); Michael D. McClintock, The Declining Use of Legal Scholarship by Courts: An Empirical
Study, 51 OKIA. L. REV. 659, 660 (1998) ("This survey reveals a 47.35% decline in the use of
legal scholarship by courts over the past two decades, the most notable decline occurring
in the past ten years."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Citing of Law Reviews by the Supreme Court:
1971-1999, 75 IND. L.J. 1009, 1010 (2000) ("We find a continuing decline in [the] number
of times the Court cited legal periodicals . . . ."); Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Jeffrey B. Margulies,
The Citing ofLaw Reviews by the Supreme Court: An Empirical Study, 34 UCLA L. REV. 131, 134
(1986) (examining two three-year periods and finding a "substantial" decline in citations
to legal periodicals by the Supreme Court); Carissa Alden et al., Trends in Federal judicial
Citations and Law Review Articles 2 (Mar. 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://
graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/20070319_federalcitations.pdf ("Courts
cited law reviews more frequently in the 1970s and 1980s than they do today."). Hricik and
Salzmann tested the "already apparent" "trend" that law review articles are deemed "'not
merely unhelpful,' but 'useless' to the bench and bar" in the following way:
[We] surveyed every opinion written by the United States Supreme Court
during the 2003-2004 term. In those opinions, 3,998 sources were cited.
Only 744 of those citations were to secondary sources, and only 108 of those
citations were to law review articles. In other words, less than three percent
of the sources the Supreme Court cited were the law review articles that are
supposed to analyze the cutting edge of legal issues, doctrine, and theory.
These numbers indicate that judges are relying on black letter law and their
own legal reasoning, rather than the theories and discussions proffered by
the individuals who ostensibly should be at the forefront of legal knowl-
edge, to effectuate their opinions.
Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 6, at 778 (footnote omitted); see also Blake Rohrbacher,
Decline: Twenty-Five Years of Student Scholarship in judicial Opinions, 80 Am. BANKR. L.J. 553,
553 (2006) (examining judicial citation to student scholarship and finding that "judicial
citation of student notes has plunged since 1980"). But cf Lawrence M. Friedman et al.,
State Supreme Courts: A Century of Style and Citation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 773, 812 (1981) (report-
ing an 8% increase in citation to legal scholarship by state supreme courts when compar-
ing 1945-55 with 1960-70).
Some articles do not claim to identify a trend but still describe the frequency ofjudi-
cial citation to law review articles. See, e.g., Louis J. Sirico, Jr. & Beth A. Drew, The Citing of
Law Reviews by the United States Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Analysis, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1051, 1052 (1991) (examining 1200 opinions issued in 1989 and finding that "the federal
circuit courts cite law reviews infrequently"); see also Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence ofa
Decade of Statutory Interpretation Scholarship on judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 53 SMU
L. REV. 9, 11 (2000) [hereinafter Crespi, Influence ofa Decade] (finding that "almost half of
the statutory interpretation articles published between 1988 and 1995 have been cited in at
least one judicial opinion" but that this statistic "is a relatively high figure" when compared
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therefore, of generally supporting the felt consensus that legal schol-
arship has lost practicable relevance. Indeed, the two bodies of schol-
arship are so mutually reinforcing 4 that it is now probably fair to say
that the claim that courts have little use for legal scholarship is con-
ventional wisdom.
An examination of the empirical studies supporting the conven-
tional wisdom reveals a variety of methodological approaches. For ex-
ample, the McClintock study used a "list of leading law journals
selected by the Chicago-Kent Law Review"'5 and examined three two-
year periods, essentially 1975-76, 1985-86, and 1995-96.ie Louis J.
Sirico and Jeffrey B. Margulies examined only Supreme Court opin-
ions and used two three-year periods spaced seven years apart,7 while
David Hricik and Victoria S. Salzmann examined opinions from a sin-
gle term of the Supreme Court.' The study performed by Carissa
Alden and her colleagues was intentionally informal. It involved five
with citation rates in general); Gregory Scott Crespi, The Influence of Two Decades of Contract
Law Scholarship on judicial Rulings: An Empirical Analysis, 57 SMU L. REv. 105, 111 (2004)
(examining a subset of contract law articles and finding that 36.4% had been judicially
cited).
Finally, some articles address other aspects of judicial citation to law review articles.
See, e.g., Gregory Scott Crespi, judicial and Law Review Citation Frequencies for Articles Published
in Different "Tiers" of Law Journals: An Empirical Analysis, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 897, 897
(2004) (finding that courts and scholars cite articles published in "the three most prestigi-
ous law journals at much higher rates" than articles appearing in lower-tierjournals); Rob-
ert M. Lawless & Ira David, The General Role Played by Specialty Law journals: Empirical Evidence
from Bankruptcy Scholarship, 80 Ami. BANKR. L.J. 523, 524 (2006) (comparing citation to bank-
ruptcy articles published in general law reviews with those published in four specialtyjour-
nals); Richard A. Mann, The Use of Legal Periodicals by Courts and journals, 26JURIMETRICS J.
400, 401 (1986) (comparingjudicial and academic citations to scholarship published from
1978 to 1979); William H. Manz, Citations in Supreme Court Opinions and Briefs: A Comparative
Study, 94 LAw LIBR. J. 267, 267 (2002) (comparing citation in Supreme Court briefs with
those in Supreme Court opinions); DeborahJ. Merritt & Melanie Putnam,Judges and Schol-
ars: Do Courts and Scholarly journals Cite the Same Law Review Articles? 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
871, 872 (1996) (comparing and contrasting the law reviews most cited by legal scholars
against those most cited by the courts); Chester A. Newland, Legal Periodicals and the United
States Supreme Court, 7 U. KAN. L. REv. 477, 479 (1959) (outlining legal periodical citations
for twenty-eight justices from 1924 to 1956); Michael J. Saks et al., Is There a Growing Gap
Among Law, Law Practice, and Legal Scholarship?: A Systematic Comparison of Law Review Articles
One Generation Apart, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 353, 361 (1996) (comparing articles published
in 1960 and 1985 for, among other things, citation by courts); Russell Smyth, Citing Outside
the Law Reports: Citations of Secondary Authorities on the Australian State Supreme Courts Over the
Twentieth Century, 18 GRIFFITH L. REV. 692, 692 (2009) (analyzing Australian state supreme
court citation to secondary sources over time).
14 See, e.g., Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 6 passim (citing to both the literature re-
flecting the felt consensus and citation studies); Remarks of Professor Aaron D. Twerski, L'65,
supra note 8, at 56 (relying on the claim that "citations to law reviews have plummeted").
15 See McClintock, supra note 13, at 683 (citing Colleen M. Cullen & S. Randall
Kalberg, Chicago-Kent Law Review Faculty Scholarship Survey, 70 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1445,
1446-47, 1452 tbl.I (1995)).
16 See id.
17 See Sirico & Margulies, supra note 13, at 132.
18 See Hricik & Salzmann, supra note 6, at 778.
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law reviews and five specialty journals, and only some federal courts.19
Sirico and Beth A. Drew examined 100 "recent" circuit court opinions
from a single year and excluded the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.20 Other judicial citation studies have focused
variously on student notes, 21 "statutory interpretation articles of a
broad, theoretical nature that were published during the 1988-97
decade,"22 and state supreme court opinions.23
The variation in methodological approaches (e.g., the use of elite
law reviews, particular articles, small samples, and nonrandom sam-
ples;24 differences in data collection; and different comparative per-
spectives) confounds efforts to draw general interpretations about the
citation to legal scholarship by courts. In fact, these methodological
limitations are serious enough to raise a concern regarding the extent
to which empirical work supports the conventional wisdom that legal
scholarship has lost practicable relevance to courts. Moreover, many
of the studies of judicial citation are starting to show their age. Cita-
tion to legal scholarship by courts may be different today than it was
during earlier-studied periods.
The study reported here adds a substantially more comprehen-
sive data set to this important body of work than previous studies: an
assessment of citation to legal scholarship in 296,098 reported deci-
sions of the federal courts of appeals25 spanning the fifty-nine years
19 See Alden et al., supra note 13, at 1-2. This is not meant to diminish the amount of
work these authors clearly expended.
20 See Sirico & Drew, supra note 13, at 1052.
21 See Rohrbacher, supra note 13, at 554-55.
22 See Crespi, Influence of a Decade, supra note 13, at 10.
23 See Friedman et al., supra note 13, at 774-75 (studying secondary-source citations
and many other aspects of state supreme court writings).
24 When it is not feasible to collect data on the entire population, good empirical
practices urge random sampling. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 108 (2002).
25 We focused on the federal appellate level because, as others have recognized, "the
circuit court judiciary is probably the single most important level of the federal judiciary in
light of its extensive caseload and policy making authority." Frank B. Cross & Stefanie
Lindquist, judging the Judges, 58 DUKE L.J. 1383, 1385 (2009); see also FRANK B. CRoss, DEcI-
SION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 1-2 (2007) ("[TJhe circuit courts are much
more important [than the United States Supreme Court] in setting and enforcing the law
of the United States."); DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAw IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF
APPEALS 4 (2002) ("The truth, well known but often overlooked in the media and even in
serious scholarship, is that lower court judges play a major role in the development of legal
doctrine."); Corey Rayburn Yung, Flexing]udicial Muscle: An Empirical Study ofJudicial Activ-
ism in the Federal Courts, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011) ("Although the actions of the
Supreme Court are higher profile, studying the courts of appeals for activism has been
substantially more informative about judges and the judiciary." (footnote omitted)).
Others have surmised that the federal appellate courts should be most receptive to law
review articles. SeeSirico & Drew, supra note 13, at 1051 ("[T]he federal circuit courts may
be the most policy-oriented tribunals and hence the most receptive to the theory-oriented
discussions of the law reviews.").
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between 1950 and 2008. Using clearly described and easily reproduci-
ble methods it further adds to the existing body of knowledge by em-
pirically exploring the stridently pressed conventional wisdom that
legal scholarship has drifted so far from the interests of the bench and
bar that courts have little use for it.
The study produces two important results. First, the data col-
lected support the interpretation that the use of legal scholarship by
the federal circuit courts of appeals has not declined. Rather, the use
of legal scholarship by such courts has increased. Taken together, the
data gathered in this study call into serious question the conventional
wisdom that courts have little use for legal scholarship.26 Second, the
study provides evidence that a relatively small cohort of judges is re-
sponsible for the overwhelming majority of citations. Using empirical
and theoretical methods, the study also considers explanations for the
empirical results.
We strive to make this Article accessible to all readers, including
those without a high level of understanding of empirical methods. To
do so, the Article's text describes the basic results, and the footnotes
and Appendix provide a more technical empirical explanation for
those who are interested.
The remainder of this Article proceeds in two parts. Part I de-
scribes the methodology employed in the study. Part II presents the
results. It includes information about citation to legal scholarship in
decisions of the federal circuit courts of appeals over the last fifty-nine
years, analyzes variables that contribute to courts' use of legal scholar-
ship, and outlines important directions for future work.
I
METHODOLOGY
This Part begins by defining what we mean when we refer to the
"use" of "legal scholarship" by judges. It then explains the techniques
used to collect the data underlying the study and reports some of the
basic parameters of the data set.
A. The "Use" of "Legal Scholarship" by Judges
In this study, "legal scholarship" means law review and lawjournal
articles.27 Our most basic research interest is in the relevance of legal
26 This finding does not, of course, mean that all legal scholarship is thus salient and
practicably relevant to the bench and bar. Part II and the Conclusion address these and
other topics.
27 Within law review and law journal articles, we intend to include academic journals,
which primarily consist of faculty-written and student-edited articles. We believe that jour-
nals directed primarily to news reporting or practitioner updates, such as the National Law
Review or state bar journals, fall into a different category and are not within our definition
[Vol. 96:13451352
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scholarship to judges. We define "relevant" by its customary defini-
tion: "having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at
hand."28 The matter at hand here is the decisional-law-making pro-
cess of the judges of the federal circuit courts of appeals. Legal schol-
arship is therefore relevant if it has a bearing on that judicial process.
Determining whether a piece of legal scholarship has a significant
and demonstrable bearing on the decisional-law-making process
presents a somewhat thorny question: how is one supposed to know?
It seems likely that in some instances legal scholarship may have a
bearing on a judge's decisional process and the judge may not even
know it. In such cases, it might be incredibly difficult to establish the
relevance of the legal scholarship. It also seems likely that in some
instances legal scholarship may have a bearing on a judge's decisional
process, and the judge knows about it but never includes an express
reference to the legal scholarship in the opinion comprising the deci-
sion. 29 In such cases, too, it might be quite difficult to establish the
relevance of the legal scholarship.
In this study, we have assumed away some of this problem by mea-
suring whether legal scholarship is relevant by tabulating its express
"use" in reported opinions.3 0 To be clear, for the purposes of this
of legal scholarship. Our definition of legal scholarship excludes treatises, hornbooks, and
similar secondary materials. We do not exclude them because they are unimportant forms
of legal scholarship; of course they are important. We exclude them from this study be-
cause the literature criticizing legal scholarship introduced above usually excludes them.
Indeed, these criticisms tend to laud the contributions of treatises and hornbooks. We also
exclude books written by academics from our definition.
28 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2004).
29 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 2, at 45 (noting that he, Judge Edwards, uses legal
scholarship without citing to it, and therefore that "citation studies invariably underesti-
mate utility").
30 Our focus on the decisional-law-making process requires, we think, the use of re-
ported opinions. Other prominent studies of citation counts focus exclusively on reported
opinions. See, e.g., William M. Landes et al., judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal
Courts of Appeals judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271 (1998). Formal evidence of decisional
law historically does not include unreported (or nonprecedential) opinions. See, e.g., FED.
CIR. R. 32.1 (authorizing unreported opinions and explaining: "[a]n opinion or order
which is designated as nonprecedential is one determined by the panel issuing it as not
adding significantly to the body of law"); id. at 36 (authorizing judgments of affirmance
without opinions and explaining: "[t]he court may enter ajudgment of affirmance without
opinion, citing this rule, when it determines that ... an opinion would have no preceden-
tial value"); see also Porter v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 210 F. App'x 996, 996 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(applying FED. CIR. R. 32.1); Waddoups v. Dep't of the Air Force, 201 F. App'x 995, 996
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (deciding an appeal without a published opinion); cf FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
(introducing permission to cite to unreported opinions in briefing as of January 1, 2007,
but not changing the precedential status of the cited opinion). This observation strongly
suggests two things. First, while there may be reasons to study the judicial use of legal
scholarship in unreported opinions, clumping unreported opinions together with re-
ported opinions in a study examining the use of legal scholarship in the decisional-law-
making process will be more confounding than informative. Second, judges should only
rarely use legal scholarship in unreported opinions since they are not intended to add to
2011] 1353
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study judges "use" scholarship when they cite to it in reported
opinions.3 1
Our approach has several advantages. 2 It measures use fairly di-
rectly by looking at what judges choose to include in the documents
communicating reported decisions.3 3 Reported decisions are docu-
ments evidencing the law, and thus citation to legal scholarship in
reported decisions brings cited scholarship into close relationship
with the law. Moreover, judges do not have to cite to legal scholar-
ship, so the choice to cite to it-even as a source of general authority
for a proposition-or to criticize it can be understood as having a
bearing on the decisional process. That is, that choice is a part of the
law. If anything, counting citations to legal scholarship in reported
decisions likely undercounts the relevance of legal scholarship to
judges. Finally, measuring the use of legal scholarship by measuring
citations in opinions has the benefit of being a fairly objective mea-
sure: not only are we not required to guess or make a subjective judg-
ment about whether the cited legal scholarship was "really" used, but
because discerning a citation to a law review article is not normally
difficult, we also lessen the likelihood of measurement error.
the law. To test the second hypothesis, we examined all unreported opinions in Westlaw
for all circuits from 1950 to 2008 and found that citation to legal scholarship, while it does
occasionally occur, is exceptionally rare.
31 There are, of course, other ways to approach the question of whether courts use
legal scholarship. Our approach-counting citations in opinions-measures judicial be-
havior. Alternatively, one could directly survey judges about their views on legal scholar-
ship. Surveying judges, however, would likely measure judicial attitudes toward legal
scholarship. Behaviors and attitudes are different, and attitudes are subject to a variety of
cognitive biases. A third alternative is to focus on law review articles instead ofjudges and
determine the proportion of legal scholarship to which courts cite. In other words, instead
of calculating the number of law review citations divided by the number of reported opin-
ions, one could calculate the number of law review citations divided by the number of
published law review articles. However, when compared to our method, this approach is
less accurate for measuring the usefulness of legal scholarship to the judiciary. That is not
to say that such a study would be uninteresting; it is just a different study and one we
believe is tangential to our research question.
32 That is not to say it is perfect. Measuring the citation to legal scholarship in opin-
ions is an imperfect measure not only because it undercounts, but also because the ap-
proach cannot control for the relevance of legal scholarship to the content of opinions
comprising decisions. It thus leaves to inference the relationship between citation to legal
scholarship in judicial opinions and the relevance of legal scholarship to both judges and
the law. Inferring relevance in this way is, perhaps, most often valid. However, judges
might cite to legal scholarship even when the citation has no bearing on the law (e.g., for
strategic reasons).
33 For our purposes, it does not matter whether the citation originated from the
judge, her clerk, one of the litigants, or some other source. All that matters is that the
judge chose to include it in a reported opinion.
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B. Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions
The original dataset built for this study follows a well-accepted
social science technique known as "content analysis."3 4 Content analy-
sis refers to summarizing documents or other messages for analysis
using objective, verifiable methods. It is applied here to judicial opin-
ions using three basic steps: first, selecting the relevant opinions;35
second, coding the selected opinions;3 6 and finally, analyzing the data
collected through coding using statistical techniques.37
Content analysis is useful for helping scholars verify, analyze, and
assess empirical claims about the content of large numbers of judicial
opinions.38 The present study, which involves over 296,000 judicial
opinions, thus presents an excellent opportunity for the application of
content analysis. That said, it should be noted that a content-analysis
approach presents concerns that should be kept in mind when inter-
preting and analyzing the results of this study.3 9 The most prominent
concerns are implied by our definition of "use" provided above: 40
unobserved reasoning, strategic behavior, and selection bias can all
34 For an article describing content analysis and its application to legal studies, see
Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofludicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 63, 79-99 (2008). For some recent examples of legal scholarship that have used con-
tent analysis as an approach to examining a body of law, see John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REv. 955, 966-76
(2007); Edward K Cheng, The Myth of the Generalist judge, 61 STAN. L. REV. 519, 530-40
(2008); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction Trends,
16 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1075, 1096-1143 (2001); Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness
and the Federal Circuit: An Empirical Analysis of Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911,
924-30 (2007); Lee Petherbridge & R. Polk Wagner, TheThe Federal Circuit and Patentability:
An Empirical Assessment of the Law of Obviousness, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2051, 2076-102 (2007); Lee
Petherbridge, On the Decline of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 1371,
1384-1404 (2010); Lee Petherbridge, Patent Law Uniformity?, 22 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 421,
438-63 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Con-
struction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1712-33 (2009); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MIcH. L.
REV. 223, 245-58 (2008); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Suc-
ceeding? An Empirical Assessment ofJudicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105, 1148-79
(2004).
35 See Hall & Wright, supra note 34, at 101-06 (explaining how case content analysts
select cases for study).
36 See id. at 107-17 (listing and elaborating upon the steps researchers should follow
in coding material).
37 See id. at 117-20 (discussing approaches to content analysis, noting the benefits of
statistical testing, and discussing two broad types of statistical analysis).
38 See id. at 72 tbl.1, 100-20 (analyzing the results of 134 studies that performed con-
tent analysis on judicial opinions).
39 Judge Edwards, for example, has been a vociferous critic of empirical studies of
appellate decision making. See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls ofEmpiri-
cal Studies That Attempt to Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DuKE
L.J. 1895, 1907-30 (2009) (discussing several limitations on empirical research into judicial
decision making).
40 See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
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limit the interpretation of data gathered using a content-analysis ap-
proach.41 Thus, as noted above, the results and discussion we provide
are subject to concerns of unobserved reasoning and strategic behav-
ior. In other words, judges almost certainly "use" legal scholarship
more than we can detect by measuring citation, 42 and judges may
elect to cite vel non legal scholarship for reasons we do not attempt to
quantify here.4 3 The study is also subject to concerns of selection
bias, 44 or the idea that perhaps cases that would most likely generate a
citation to legal scholarship are selected against such that they are less
likely to generate an appellate opinion. 45
Nonetheless, the current claims and conventional wisdom sur-
rounding judicial use of legal scholarship strongly suggest, we think, a
need to begin to systematically assess and understand the topic. An
important first step in developing this area of study includes making
efforts to quantify judicial use of scholarship and identify factors upon
which judicial use of scholarship depends. Content analysis-despite
(and probably more accurately because of) its well-known limita-
41 See Hall & Wright, supra note 34, at 85-100.
42 See Paul L. Caron, The Long Tail of Legal Scholarship, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 38,
41 (2006), http://www.thepocketpart.org/ylj-online/scholarship/59-the-long-tail-of-legal-
scholarship ("Citations reflect one particular end-use of an article; they do not measure
how many times an article is read but not cited by a judge or professor.").
43 For example, perhaps judges writing for the court strategically avoid citing legal
scholarship so that rationales offered in an opinion appear to flow naturally from existing
precedents, and perhaps judges writing alternative opinions strategically emphasize legal
scholarship to bolster an argument for a change in law or to seek allies for en banc review.
44 See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STuD. 1, 24 (1984) (explaining that because so few cases reach an appellate judg-
ment, such cases may not be representative of all lawsuits or disputes).
45 For example, they might settle or be disposed of without any opinion. For more on
unpublished opinions, see Kirt Shuldberg, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished
Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 541, 545-51 (1997), which notes
that the use of unpublished opinions was first proposed in 1964 and first implemented in
the early 1970s. Others have noted that unpublished opinions often constitute a substan-
tial percentage of a court's opinions and are often similar to published opinions in many
respects. See Michael Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States
Courts ofAppeals, 3J. App. PRAc. & PROCEss 199, 201 (2001) (reporting that less than 21% of
opinions in the federal courts of appeals are published); Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Please Ignore
This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 1013, 1014, 1023-35 (2004) (reporting that the Federal Circuit publishes only 23%
of its opinions and that the publication rate varies by the subject matter of the case). See
generally Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals:
Formal Rules Versus Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 313 (1990) (demonstrating that
official criteria for publication do not accurately describe differences between published
and unpublished opinions). Using only reported decisions thus has the potential to pro-
vide a biased sample. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 39, at 1922-24 (identifying the
omission of unpublished decisions as a problem with the U.S. courts of appeals database
that empiricists use). However, based on our examination of large numbers of unreported
opinions, reported opinions contain the overwhelming majority of citations to legal schol-
arship. See supra note 30. It thus appears that circuit judges are not saving the use of legal
scholarship for unreported opinions.
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tions-presents a broadly understood and accepted means of ap-
proaching these important tasks.
C. The Judicial Citation to Legal Scholarship Database
The data set built for this study includes information collected
from all reported opinions46 issued between 1950 and 2008 for all of
the federal circuit courts of appeals.47 Coding was automated using a
precise query48 executed against each Westlaw federal appellate court
database.49 The query locates citations to law reviews and lawjournals
46 "Reported opinions" means those opinions Westlaw so designates. We did not dis-
tinguish between opinions for the court and alternative opinions. The Westlaw federal
circuit court databases used were CTAIR, CTA2R, CTA3R, CTA4R, CTA5R, CTA6R,
CTA7R, CTA8R, CTA9R, CTA1OR, CTAI1R, CTADCR, and CTAFEDR. As Westlaw's de-
scriptions of each of these databases explain, they include "[r]eported cases from the fed-
eral appellate courts authoritative" in the circuit, with coverage beginning in 1945. E.g.,
U.S. Court of Appeals, 1st Circuit Cases, Reported, WESTLAw DATABASE DIRECTORY, http://
directory.westlaw.com/scope/default.asp?db=CTAR&RS=WDIR2.0&VR=2.0 (last visited
July 18, 2011). The Eleventh and Federal Circuits did not exist until well after that date.
The Federal Circuit database appears empty before the Federal Circuit's creation in 1982.
The Eleventh Circuit database appears to replicate the Fifth Circuit database before 1980,
the year the Fifth Circuit split into the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits. We excluded the dupli-
cative Fifth and Eleventh Circuit data.
47 Based on our examination of all available unreported opinions, the overwhelming
majority of citations to legal scholarship are found in reported opinions. See supra note 30.
48 In a previous draft of this Article, we employed a search query that relied upon the
Bluebook and the fact that nearly all law reviews include "law review" or "law journal" in
their title. We developed the query over the course of several months and refined it
through multiple conversations with Westlaw search specialists and by trial and error. Nu-
merous people reviewed the query after several blogs featured a draft of this Article. See
e.g., lantha Haight, Court Citation of Legal Scholarship on the Rise, THE COMPETITIVE EDGE,
(Aug. 17, 2011, 3:10 PM) http://blog.law.cornell.edu/library/2010/08/17/court-citation-
of-legal-scholarship-on-the-rise (noting that the search query was "impressive" and about as
close to perfect "as you can reasonably get"). Unfortunately, we recently discovered that
West, for reasons we do not presently understand, removes blank spaces from citations on
an apparent haphazard basis. The haphazard removal appears to occur much more fre-
quently in opinions issued before about 1997. Compounding this problem, Westlaw
search specialists have recently advised us that it is not possible to craft a search query that
locates citations without spaces-e.g., to the harv.l.rev. instead of harv. l.rev.-unless the
journal's exact name is included as a search term. The impact of this discovery is that our
original search query does not locate some of the citations to legal scholarship in Westlaw
circuit court databases and we have not discovered a way of locating them without hard
coding in each journal's West-formatted title. Future researchers should therefore be cau-
tious when utilizing Westlaw for research concerning citation in Westlaw databases. To
address this data inconsistency, we constructed a new query that included hard-coded
West-formatted journal titles and experimented with the query until we discovered a query
the positive responses to which were not substantially increased by the addition of new
journals. We then regenerated all of our data.
49 The exact Westlaw search for citations in each year YYYY is: "da( [YWY]) & (("lj."
"l. rev." "l.rev." "j.l." "law review" harv.l.rev. stan.l.rev. colum.l.rev. n.y.u.1.rev. va.l.rev.
cal.l.rev. u.pa.l.rev. mich.l.rev. geo.lj. tex.l.rev. ucla.l.rev. nw.u.1.rev. minn.l.rev. u.chi.l.rev.
vand.l.rev. b.u.1.rev. b.c.l.rev. n.c.l.rev. s.cal.l.rev. u.ill.l.rev. ind.lj. wis.l.rev. fla.l.rev.
am.u.1.rev. ariz.l.rev. ariz.st.l.j. wash.u.1.rev. geo.wash.l.rev. u.colo.l.rev. ga.l.rev. ala.l.rev.
u.cin.l.rev. st.l.rev. wash.l.rev. byu.1.rev. md.l.rev. tul.l.rev. fla.l.rev. hous.l.rev.) /10 (20**
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and excludes citations to treatises or hornbooks.5 0 It includes all law
reviews and lawjournals, not merely the "elite" ones. We obtained the
raw number of reported opinions issued by each court on an annual
basis. For consistency, we relied upon the same Westlaw databases to
obtain the total number of reported decisions per year by using a
blank query.51
Overall, the database includes 296,098 opinions, of which 22,479
include at least one citation to legal scholarship. Because we used an
automated search, we did not read each opinion to count citations.
Instead, we executed the Westlaw query for each year and circuit
court and recorded the number of hits generated. The citation
search query thus counts each opinion citing to legal scholarship
once, even if the opinion cited to multiple pieces of scholarship.5 2
Consequently the results reported by the present study are likely to be
a conservative measure of citation to legal scholarship by the courts.
The rate of false positives-opinions that respond to the Westlaw
query but do not, in fact, cite to legal scholarship-is 1.4% of all re-
ported opinions scoring positive for citation to legal scholarship.5 3
The false-negative rate, which measures opinions that cite to legal
19** 18**)) % ((j.1. /4 v.) ti((j. /2 1.) ljjlj.L. 1.j.) (at(ljjl lj.j.1.)) ("nat! 1.j." "national law
journal"))." We performed the search in the Westlaw databases listed above, supra note 46,
which include only reported decisions. The use of rev., review, and j. is meant to include
as many law reviews and journals as possible. The search includes all of the flagship jour-
nals of the top 100 law schools as ranked by U.S. News & World Report in 2010. See Schools of
Law: The Top 100 Schools, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 2010, at 74, 74-75. Of the top fifty
journals using Washington and Lee University's combined 2009 rankings, forty-eight fall
within the search, and ninety-four of the top 100 are responsive. See Law journals: Submis-
sions and Ranking, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L., http://lawlib.wlu.edu/j/indexOlderYears.aspx
(last visited July 18, 2011) (check the box labeled "Comb." and "2009"; then click "Sub-
mit"). Excluded are Supreme Court Review (27); Law & Contemporary Problems (42); Yale Jour-
nal on Regulation (67); the Business Lawyer (68); University of Chicago Legal Forum (80); and
Supreme Court Economic Review (97). See id.
50 This is because, as noted above, see supra note 27, the criticisms of legal scholarship
identified in the Introduction usually exclude these forms of legal scholarship; indeed, the
criticisms more often laud treatises and hornbooks, focusing their ire on law review
articles.
51 The exact Westlaw search for opinions in each year YYYY is: "date ([YYYY]) and
court." The word "court" is included because Westlaw prohibits date-only searches. The
word "court" is present in all opinions in the case caption. See Christopher A. Cotropia,
Determining Uniformity Within the Federal Circuit by Measuring Dissent and En Banc Review, 43
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 801, 811 n.59 (2010).
52 Note also that this study treats all citations of legal scholarship as equal. In reality,
some cases include extensive analysis of, discussion of, and reliance upon law review arti-
cles, while others cite to scholarship only in passing.
53 We calculated the false-positive rate based upon a 5% random sample of the
dataset. For the random sample, we manually reviewed the Westlaw citation results to as-
certain which results were not of legal scholarship. An example of a false positive was a
case that included the phrase "Letter No. 538 (July 21, 1971) by J. L. Robertson, CCH
Cons. Credit Guide." Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 532 F.2d 86, 92 n.10 (8th Cir.
1976).
1358 [Vol. 96:1345
THE USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
scholarship but are nonresponsive to our Westlaw query, is 2.3% of all
reported opinions scoring positive for citation to legal scholarship.5 4
II
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
This Part begins with the exploration of a very basic research
question: how much have the judges of the federal courts of appeals
used legal scholarship over the fifty-nine years of our study? It then
moves to a more specific, but still very basic research question: has
there been a decline in the use of legal scholarship by the judges of
the federal courts of appeals? Here the data provide evidence of a
rather surprising result: over the fifty-nine years we examined, there
has not been a decline in the use of legal scholarship; rather, there
has been a marked increase in the use of legal scholarship in the re-
ported opinions of the circuit courts of appeals. This finding raises
serious doubts about the conventional wisdom and suggests that easy
conclusions about the meaning of legal scholarship to judges may be
difficult to reach. Using empirical and theoretical means, this Part
continues by considering explanations for courts' increased use of le-
gal scholarship.
A. Judges of the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Use Legal
Scholarship More Now Than in the Past
To get a broad perspective on the use of legal scholarship by
judges over the fifty-nine years we studied, we combined all of the
reported opinions from all of the circuits and calculated the rate at
which judges cited legal scholarship during that period. Of the
296,098 reported decisions of the federal courts of appeals spanning
years 1950-2008, 22,479 (7.6%), or roughly one in every 13.2 deci-
sions, cited at least one law review or law journal article.
As noted in the Introduction, the conventional wisdom is that
courts have little use for legal scholarship. Perhaps the most signifi-
cant empirical evidence for this claim in the scholarly literature is the
54 We calculated the false-negative rate based upon the same 5% random sample used
to calculate the false-positive rate. See supra note 53. For these random circuits and years,
we manually reviewed the results from a broader Westlaw search: "(da(YYYY) & ("lj." "I.
rev." "l.rev." "j1." "law review" "law journal" harv.l.rev. stan.l.rev. colum.l.rev. n.y.u.l.rev.
va.l.rev. cal.l.rev. u.pa.l.rev. mich.l.rev. geo.l.j. tex.l.rev. ucla.1.rev. nw.u.l.rev. minn.l.rev.
u.chi.1.rev. vand.l.rev. b.u.1.rev. b.c.l.rev. n.c.l.rev. s.cal.l.rev. u.ill.l.rev. ind.lj. wis.l.rev.
fla.l.rev. am.u.1.rev. ariz.l.rev. ariz.st.1.j. wash.u.1.rev. geo.wash.l.rev. u.colo.l.rev. ga.1.rev.
ala.l.rev. u.cin.l.rev. st.l.rev. wash.l.rev. byu.l.rev. md.1.rev. tul.l.rev. fla.l.rev. hous.l.rev.))."
We then determined how many citations to scholarship were responsive to the broader
search but missed by our precise search query. The false-positive and -negative rates were




repeated observation of a decline in the use of legal scholarship by
courts. The empirical claim is, notably, directional. It describes a
landscape that shows greater citation by courts to legal scholarship in
the past, or a downward-sloping trend in the frequency with which
courts cite legal scholarship as one moves forward through time. The
empirical claim can be unpacked into two related claims: (1) there
has been a decrease over time in the raw number of opinions that
contain citations; and (2) there has been a decrease over time in the
proportion of opinions that contain citations. The difference be-
tween the claims is that the latter accounts for the total number of
opinions issued by the court, which has generally increased over time.
We address both claims below.
To examine the first empirical claim in more detail, we divided
the fifty-nine-year period covered by the study roughly in half. The
first group contains all reported opinions citing at least one law review
article issued between 1950 and 1979 (thirty years). The second
group contains all reported opinions citing at least one law review arti-
cle issued between 1980 and 2008 (twenty-nine years).
TABLE 1.
REPORTED OPINIONS CITING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP5 5
Period Opinions Citing % of Total
1950-1979 8320 37.0
1980-2008 13450 63.0
Table 1 shows that the overwhelming majority of reported circuit
court opinions citing legal scholarship occur in the more recent pe-
riod, between 1980 and 2008.
To gather additional evidence about the empirical claim that
there has been a decline in the use of legal scholarship by the courts
(and the judges that comprise them), we plotted the number of re-
ported opinions citing legal scholarship against time (Figure 1).
55 Table I shows the number of reported opinions citing at least one law review article
in particular time periods of the study. For example, in the first thirty years included in
the study, 1950-79, federal circuit courts issued 8320 reported opinions that cited at least
one law review article. The 8,320 opinions represent a substantial minority (only 37.0%) of
the citations found in the study.
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FIGURE 1.
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Figure 1 suggests an mnterpretation directly contrary to the claim
that there has been decline in the use of legal scholarship by courts.
A visual inspection suggests an upward, and in any event not a down-
ward, trend in the number of opinions citing legal scholarship over
the last fifty-nine years.5 Further evidence of an upward trend is
found in the least squares trendline fitted to the data, which has a
significant positive (upward trend) slope. After rising steadily, the
number of opinions citing legal scholarship reached a high point in
the early to mid-1980s. The number of opinions citing legal scholar-
ship then trended downward for about seven to eight years, and then
leveled off around 1990 and held steady at a rate substantially higher
56 Figure 1 shows the number of reported circuit court opinions citing legal
scholarship for each year starting in 1950. On the abscissa, the year (Year) studied moves
from left to right. The ordinate shows the square root of the number of reported opinions
(Number of Opinions (sqrt)) citing at least one law review article. A linear (i.e., ordinary
least squares (OLS)) trendline is imposed, the slope of which is positive and statistically
significant. It has the following statistical characteristics: 18 = 0.222, tob = 13.602, p < 0.000.
The regression was performed with StatPlus and the graph was created using Numbers.
57 Because it measures the actual number of reported opinions citing legal scholar-
ship, the observed trend accounts for unreported opinions as well. If unreported data
were added to Figure 1, the number of opinions citing legal scholarship over the last fifty-
nine years would increase, if only a little. In other words, the observed trend should not
change direction, nor should the slope coefficient lose statistical significance.
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than that observed in the first half of the period studied.5 8 Put differ-
ently, if one compares the first ten years (1950-59) with the most re-
cent ten years (1999-2008), one finds over six times as many opinions
citing legal scholarship in the more recent period.
Table 1 and Figure 1 rely on absolute numbers of reported opin-
ions citing to law review articles. These data therefore defy the claim
that there has been a decline in courts' absolute use of legal scholar-
ship. Bereft of the empirical assertion that there has been an overall
decline in judicial use of legal scholarship, some critics of legal schol-
arship's usefulness may seek to fall back to a narrower claim. They
may concede that a greater absolute number of opinions cite to legal
scholarship but that the reason for this increase is a concomitant in-
crease in the number of reported opinions in recent years. In that
case, they might adhere to the narrower argument that there has been
a decline in the proportion of reported opinions citing legal
scholarship.
To examine this second, narrower claim of decline in use of legal
scholarship by the courts, we plotted the proportion of reported opin-
ions citing legal scholarship against time (Figure 2).
FIGuRE 2.
PROPORTION OF REPORTED OPINIONS CITING LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP OVER TIME5 9
6
0 .l4ll l*
15 1 1980 10 0 1 23*
0
Year
58 in a previous draft of the Article, we reported an upward trend in citations in the
last twenty years. This observation appears to have been affected by the Westlaw search
issue highlighted supra note 48. The current data indicate that the use of scholarship has
been level over the last twenty years, though at the higher level noted.
s9 Figure 2 shows the proportion of reported circuit court opinions citing legal
scholarship for each year starting in 1950. On the abscissa the year (Year) studied moves
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Similar to Figure 1, Figure 2 suggests that there has been no de-
cline in the proportion of reported opinions citing legal scholarship.
In particular, it shows that in the past a relatively small proportion of
reported circuit court opinions cited legal scholarship, and that over
time there has been a marked increase in the proportion of reported
circuit court opinions that cite legal scholarship. Like Figure 1, Fig-
ure 2 reveals an upward trend in the least squares trendline fitted to
the data, which has a significant positive (upward trend) slope. Also
like Figure 1, the proportion of opinions citing legal scholarship
reached a high point in the late 1970s to early to mid-1980s. The
proportion of opinions citing legal scholarship then trended down-
ward for roughly seven to eight years coming to level around 1990 and
since holding steady at a rate substantially higher than in the earlier
years studied. If one were to compare the first ten years (1950-59)
with the most recent ten years (1999-2008), one finds that the pro-
portion of reported opinions citing legal scholarship in the recent pe-
riod is over two and a half times that of the earlier period.
Whether considered separately or together, the data gathered
and reported in this subpart suggest evidence against the claim that
there has been an overall decline in the use of legal scholarship by
federal circuit courts. As time has passed, federal circuit courts have
on the whole written more opinions citing legal scholarship and cited
to legal scholarship in a higher proportion of reported opinions. 6 0
Indeed, these results seem to lead in the direction of an altogether
different claim: there has been an increase in the use of legal scholar-
ship by courts over the last fifty-nine years.
We close this subpart by acknowledging that while the overall
trend is upward, there is some trend variability: a high watermark for
the citation to law reviews in the late 1970s to early to mid-1980s, 61
and apparent points of inflection in the early to mid-1980s and
around 1990. The reasons for these phenomena are currently un-
from left to right. The ordinate shows the proportion of reported opinions (Proportion of
Opinions (sqrt)) citing at least one law review article. As in Figure 1, the time-citation
relationship here is roughly linear (as suggested by a review of the residuals following
regression), although perhaps not perfectly so (the residuals suggest the possibility of an
inflection in the late 1970s and the early 1990s). A linear (i.e., ordinary least squares)
trendline is imposed, the slope of which is positive and statistically significant. It has the
following statistical characteristics: R2 = 0.121, ti = 9.439, p < 0.000. The regression was
performed with StatPlus and the graph was created using Numbers.
60 One commenter to an earlier draft of this Article speculated that student notes may
be cited more often now than in the past because they are more likely to address issues of
concern to the judiciary than faculty scholarship. To evaluate this claim, we reviewed a
random sample of cited articles. It turns out that the speculation is incorrect. Student
notes are cited much less frequently in recent opinions than in opinions before 1980.
61 It is interesting that when Judge Edwards launched his critique of legal scholarship
in 1992, see Edwards, supra note 2, the appellate courts' use of legal scholarship was begin-
ning to level off after a temporary period of decline.
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clear, but a visual inspection of Figures 1 and 2 suggest the interpreta-
tion that circuit variation might play a role, namely, that some of the
increase observed in the late 1970s and early 1980s might be a func-
tion of the behavior toward legal scholarship of some "high-citing"
circuits.62 It is also tempting to speculate that information technology
might affect trends in judicial use of legal scholarship. In that connec-
tion, we note that LexisNexis and Westlaw became electronically avail-
able in the mid-1970s, and most readers will be familiar with the
Internet boom and introduction of HeinOnline in the mid-1990s and
2000, respectively.63 Also, computer word processors became more
widely available in the 1980s and 1990s, replacing typewriters and fa-
cilitating the ability to cut and paste in documents. 64 This is all just
speculation, of course, and in the next subpart, we turn our attention
to developing some explanations for why courts use or do not use
legal scholarship.
B. Why Do the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals Use or Not
Use Legal Scholarship?
Here we turn to the difficult question of what we may infer from
the fact that courts cite legal scholarship more today than they have in
62 As we explained supra note 30, unreported opinions are not material to an assess-
ment of the use of legal scholarship in the development of the law. For those who are
interested nonetheless, we note that the number of unreported opinions has been rela-
tively flat over the past twenty years, and thus there has not been a decline in the propor-
tion of all opinions (including reported and unreported) citing to legal scholarship in that
time period.
63 As points of reference, Lexis went online in 1973 and Westlaw went online in 1975.
See William G. Harrington, A Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAw LIBR. J.
543, 553 (1985). HeinOnline launched in 2000, History, HEINONLINE http://
home.heinonline.org/about/history (last visited July 18, 2011), and the Internet boom be-
gan in the mid- to late-1990s. LexisNexis and Westlaw may have permitted judges and
lawyers to locate case law more easily, which they then inserted into opinions and briefs,
respectively. Being able to easily find primary authority reduced the need to read (and cite
to) law reviews to find the underlying black letter law. Furthermore, neither LexisNexis
nor Westlaw included any legal scholarship until 1982; each service expanded their legal
scholarship databases slowly thereafter. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Last Wites? Reassessing the
Law Review in the Age of Cyberspace, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 615, 657-58 (1996). In the 1990s, the
Internet made it much easier to find law reviews.
64 There are many other possible explanations for the results. For example, the num-
ber of law clerks afforded to each appellate court judge has increased over time. Cf I.
Scort MESSINGER, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ORDER IN THE COURTs: A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
COURT CLERK'S OFFICE 58 (2002). Increasing the number of clerks may have altered who
was responsible for preparing the initial draft of the opinion. The type of legal scholarship
published by law reviews may have changed as well, moving away from more doctrinal
scholarship. See McClintock, supra note 13, at 659 ('Judges and practitioners increasingly
feel that there is a lack of legal scholarship that they can use when they face their daily case
loads."). Citation practices by judges may have changed as well. See generally Casey R.
Fronk, The Cost ofJudicial Citation: An Empirical Investigation of Citation Practices in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL' 51 (finding an increase in overall citations
of case law in opinions, but a decrease in string citations of case law over time).
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the past. To provide a richer empirical account, we next more rigor-
ously evaluate the data from the time period from 1990 to 2008. The
analysis that follows blends empirical evidence and inference with in-
tuition and, in some instances, outright hypothesizing as to what vari-
ables explain the observed heightened judicial use of legal
scholarship. It has two parts, focusing first on developments affecting
the judicial task and the availability and access to legal scholarship.
The second part focuses on evidence suggesting that judicial identity
may play a role in the use of legal scholarship.
The central empirical support underlying the following discus-
sion comes from a multiple regression model: a statistical argument
that allows researchers to explore the contribution of multiple vari-
ables (often called "explanatory" or "independent" variables) to an
outcome (often called a "response" or "dependent" variable). Here,
the outcome of interest is the proportion of opinions that cite to legal
scholarship by federal circuit courts of appeals. The model identified
a number of variables that might help explain judicial use of legal
scholarship.65 Figure 3 summarizes the variables that significantly im-
pact whether judges use legal scholarship.
The values illustrated in Figure 3 have been standardized, a per-
spective that allows one to compare contributions of variables to one
another. For example, according to the summary of the model, Total-
Cim (the total number of criminal appeals in a circuit) contributes to
judicial use of legal scholarship to a degree similar to JCS-Circuit Courts
(a measure of the ideology of the circuit courts). In addition, some of
the values reported in Figure 3 are negative, such as TotalCim. A neg-
ative value suggests that the associated variable negatively contributes
to judicial use of legal scholarship. For example, higher numbers of
appeals predict a decrease in judicial use of legal scholarship.
65 We also experimented with a binomial regression, where the dependent variable
was the number of opinions citing to legal scholarship and the number of reported opin-
ions was an exposure variable. The results were qualitatively similar to those from the
simpler OLS regression. Specifically, the same variables were statistically significant and
the coefficients all had the same sign. One other variable,JCS-Supreme Court, was significant
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1. Busier judges and Specific Types of Cases
The model 67 suggests that the busier a court is (in terms of the
work required of each judge) the less likely it is to cite legal scholar-
ship. In fact, the strongest explanatory variable in terms of magnitude
of effect-Reported Opinions/Active Judge-predicts that reported opin-
ions citing legal scholarship decline as the number of reported opin-
ions authored per active circuit judge increases.
The variable TotalCrim also predicts a decrease in judicial citation
to legal scholarship, suggesting that as the number of opinions di-
rected to criminal appeals increases, federal circuit courts use less le-
gal scholarship. We hypothesize that this variable might also suggest
that busy courts are less likely to cite legal scholarship. Our thinking
is based on the common understanding that federal courts have been
exposed to an increase in criminal cases and appeals from such
66 Figure 3 reports standardized coefficients (P3s) from a multiple regression model
(R' = 0.7326) examining the contribution of various explanatory variables on the
proportion of reported opinions citing legal scholarship from 1990 to 2008. Rep. Opinions/
Active judge measures the number of reported opinions authored per active circuit judge.
judicial Common Space refers to scores for the regional circuits and for the Supreme Court.
See Lee Epstein et al., The Judicial Common Space, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 303, 306-09 (2007);
infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. For the JCS scores used in this study, see Lee
Epstein: Research, Nw. L., http://epstein.law.northwestern.edu/research/JCS.html (follow
"here" hyperlinks) (last visited July 18, 2011). TotalCrim measures the total number of
reported and unreported criminal appellate decisions for each data point. TotalConlaw
measures the number of opinions involving a constitutional issue. All of the variables in
Figure 3 are significant at a = 0.05. See infra Appendix. Moreover, TotalConlaw is
significant at a = 0.01 and Rep. Opinions/Active judge is significant at a =0.001. The brackets
at the end of the variables represent the standard errors. A conventional report of three
regression models can be found in the Appendix.
67 The model, which includes circuit and year dummy variables, explains 73% of the
variance in citation to legal scholarship by courts, suggesting that there likely are other
variables that also explain courts' use of legal scholarship.
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cases,68 and so part of the way in which one circuit may be busier than
another is in bearing a disproportionate increase in criminal caseload.
We emphasize that this is just hypothesizing. We have not excluded
the possibility that hearing more criminal cases might decrease cita-
tion to legal scholarship for other reasons. For example, it may be
that the issues presented are more routine or that the culture or de-
tails of criminal appellate practice are less receptive to the use of legal
scholarship.69
The interpretation that the busier a court is (in terms of the work
required of each judge) the less likely it is to cite legal scholarship-
besides being fairly intuitive-finds some support in the anecdotal
literature. For example, Judge Ambro of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit has explained that he does not have time to read and
synthesize law review articles-he is simply too busy deciding cases.7 0
The variable TotalConLaw in Figure 3 predicts an increase in cita-
tion to legal scholarship by courts. The higher the number of opin-
ions dealing with a constitutional law issue, the more a federal court
of appeals uses legal scholarship. As there is ample legal scholarship
directed to constitutional law issues, this result does not seem surpris-
ing. Furthermore, constitutional law issues are often perceived to be
of extreme importance, and the courts may rely more upon legal
scholarship in cases perceived to be important.
2. judicial Identity
Judicial identity seems to play a role in citation to legal scholar-
ship. The regression contains Judicial Common Space score variables
which measure of the ideology of the circuit courts of appeals and the
Supreme Court for each year.7 ' These scores map judicial ideology
from -1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). The circuit court
ideology variable is based upon appointing president and senate com-
68 See, e.g., Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93
MARQ. L. REV. 825, 828 (2009) (noting the "sheer increase in federal criminal appeals over
time").
69 One of this Article's authors (David Schwartz) believes that these reasons likely do
explain a large amount of the criminal appeal impact.
70 Ambro, supra note 5, at 549 (noting that the increased judicial workload requires
him to "decide most issues on the cases cited in the briefs or on the case that [his] own
research has turned up").
71 CROSS, supra note 25, at 19 (noting thatJCS scores are the "best currently available
measure for circuit court judicial ideology").
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position during confirmation of judges.72 It is populated for each
year and each circuit.73
As shown in Figure 3, citation to legal scholarship depends on
ideology, at least as measured by the JCS scores. The regression pro-
vides evidence that the more conservative a circuit court is at a given
time (as measured by the variable judicial Common Space), the less
likely it is that its reported opinions cite to legal scholarship. Con-
versely, the more liberal a circuit is, the more likely that its reported
decisions cite to legal scholarship.74 What this might mean is a topic
for a different article; however, it is worth noting here that the ideol-
ogy of the court is the average ideology of the individual judges.
Thus, while a relatively rough measure, its predictive impact suggests
that the ideology of the judges may play a role in the use of legal
scholarship in reported decisions.75
The distribution of citation by regional circuit judges constitutes
additional empirical evidence consistent with the proposition that ju-
dicial identity impacts citation to legal scholarship. Figure 4 shows
that only 14.2% of all judges are responsible for roughly 50% of
citations.76 This result suggests that there is something different
about a relatively small cohort of judges who, for some reason,77
72 See Epstein et al., supra note 66, at 310-14. Basically, JCS scores for appellate
judges begin with NOMINATE scores, which scale issues for presidents, representatives,
and senators for every term. They are adjusted with some measure for the home-state
Senators of a nominated appellate courtjudge. The Supreme CourtJCS scores are calcu-
lated along the same scale by a complex algorithm that includes voting patterns on issues
before the Supreme Court. Some law professors have criticized the ideological coding of
issues by political scientists. See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Context of Ideology: Law, Politics,
and Empirical Legal Scholarship, 75 Mo. L. REv. 79, 79 (2010) (arguing that coding ignores
the role of law in judicial decision making and presumes that cases can be broken down
into a simple liberal-conservative distinction).
73 The Supreme Court ideology variable is a transformed Martin-Quinn score, which
is another measure of ideology developed from votes by justices. See generally Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the
U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145-52 (2002) (presenting a model
for estimating judicial ideology and applying it to the Supreme CourtJustices for the years
1953 through 1999).
74 The Supreme Court'sJCS score is not statistically significant in the OLS regression.
75 It is tempting to speculate about the implications of this result. At this point, we
offer several possible explanations. First, perhaps there is more liberal than conservative
legal scholarship, which is plausible based upon the perceived leftward slant of the acad-
emy. If this is true, there is more supportive legal scholarship for liberal judges to cite.
Second, perhaps conservative judges are more likely to be legal formalists, who are less
likely to rely upon legal scholarship in their decision making.
76 Sirico finds a skew in the citations by Supreme Court Justices, with Justice Souter
accounting for over one-third of the citations. See Sirico, supra note 13, at 1013.
7 At this point we have little firm empirical information on why this is so. This distri-
bution does not account for time because it includes total citations from 1990 to 2008
instead of rate of citation per year. Some of the judges with the highest levels of citation
have had long tenures as circuit judges (e.g., Judges Posner, Easterbrook, and Becker).
Presumably, the longer someone has been a circuit judge the longer they have had to
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At this point we have little firm empirical information on why
some judges differ from others in terms of citation to scholarship.
publish reported opinions that use legal scholarship. By contrast, a circuit judge ap-
pointed twelve months ago will have had far fewer opportunities to write opinions that cite
legal scholarship. It is not the case however, that long-tenured judges all have high levels
of citation while more recently appointed judges all have less.
78 For example, the median of all circuit judges (n = 356) in the dataset is thirteen
reported opinions citing, while the top citers were an order of magnitude higher, with 528,
355, and 346 citations, respectively (counting all identified citations as in Figure 4, see infra
note 79).
79 Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution of citations from 1990 to 2008. On the
abscissa the cumulative percentage of judges (n = 356) moving from 0% on the left to
100% right. The ordinate shows the percentage of cumulative percentage of citations.
The distribution is nonlinear, having a long tail encompassing a large cohort of circuit
courtjudges. The hatched lines reveal the percentage ofjudges on each side of 50% of all
citation to legal scholarship. The raw data point nearest 50% citations is 50.30%, which
corresponds to 85.96% of circuitjudges. The data reported here counts all full citations in
opinions in the dataset (so one opinion may give rise to more than one counted citation;
short citations not included) as opposed to all opinions citing at least one piece of legal
scholarship (so one opinion may give rise to only a single counted citation-the technique







Speculation is always possible. For example, some judges may simply
be more intellectually curious and choose to spend precious time en-
gaged with legal scholarship while other judges make time in their
lives for other pursuits. Or perhaps the use of legal scholarship re-
flects a philosophy ofjudging, a hypothesis that finds some support in
the observations that citation to legal scholarship depends on JCS
score and that a relatively small subset of judges accounts for most of
the citations. In any event, a detailed investigation into the impact of
judicial identity on the use of legal scholarship is, we think, best ad-
dressed in future work.80
C. Future Directions for Work
The work presented in this Article suggests three main avenues of
future research that should prove fruitful in helping to understand
how legal scholarship defines the relationship between the academy
and the bench and the bar.81
1. What Variables Explain judicial Use of Legal Scholarship?
While the work presented here suggests some explanations for
why judges use or do not use legal scholarship, more work is called for
in this area. First, the regression model presented here explains
about three-quarters of the variation in courts' citation to scholarship,
suggesting that there are other-and perhaps quite powerful-vari-
ables upon which judicial citation to legal scholarship depends.82 It
could be that ease of finding and access to scholarship-perhaps
brought about by the flourishing of Internet publication (SSRN,
bepress, HeinOnline, LexisNexis, Westlaw, etc.), efficient web brows-
ers, and a culture that rewards aggressive self-promotion by legal
80 Judges within the cohort include Judges Posner, Frank Easterbrook, Edward
Becker, Edmund Lynch, Alex Kozinski, and Guido Calabresi. We note that many of these
judges were academics before joining the bench. It also appears that there has been an
increase in appointments of former academics to the federal circuit courts of appeals in
the last thirty years. See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 1, 44 fig.1 (2001).
Interestingly, the top three citing judges (Posner, Easterbrook, and Becker) are also the
top three circuitjudges most cited by the Supreme Court. SeeJeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E.
George, judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S. Courts of Appeals: A Citation Analysis ofJudicial Influ-
ence 15-17 tbl.3 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 05-24), avail-
able at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=789544.
81 One of the most obvious avenues for future exploration is independent testing of
the hypotheses and interpretations this Article makes; we think that developing a rich un-
derstanding of this important topic demands a science-oriented approach.
82 We ran three separate regression models, one with the main reported variables of
interest, a second one that also included dummy variables for each circuit, and a final one
that includes dummy variables for each circuit and year from 1990 through 2008. As noted
supra note 67, with both the year and circuit dummy variables, the model accounts for
about 73% of the variation in the use of legal scholarship (1' = 0.7326). Without these
dummy variables, the model accounts for about 45% of the variation (12 = 0.4517). The
full results for each model are provided in the Appendix.
1370 [Vol. 96:1345
THE USE OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
scholars (e.g., blogging and other forms of networking and cross-com-
municating) -might play an important role in the judicial use of legal
scholarship.83 Furthermore, our empirical analysis is limited to the
time period 1990-2008. Different factors may have been important in
earlier periods, so empirical investigation of periods before 1990 is
warranted.
We also provide evidence suggesting that judicial identity plays a
role in judicial use of legal scholarship.84 But here, too, our study
leaves many more questions than it answers. Our model suggests that
judicial ideology might play a role, but how ideology translates into a
decision to cite or not cite law review articles is far from clear. In
addition, we present evidence suggesting that some judges are very
different from their colleagues in that they cite legal scholarship far
more often.85 But have judges always differed in this manner?8 6 And
what is special about the judges who use legal scholarship much more
often than their colleagues? Are they law professors themselves or ac-
ademically minded for some other reason? Is this related to ideology
in some way or to some philosophy of judging? 7 Or does it simply
reflect variation in the intellectual curiosity of judges-or at least vari-
ation in the means by which some judges satisfy their intellectual
curiosity?
At a recent talk, Justice Antonin Scalia commented that the shelf
life of a law review article is about five years.8 8 Assuming that is so,
and thus assuming that in many instances courts use relatively recent
legal scholarship, has something changed about law review articles
that encourages judges to use them more? One possible explanation
here might be the online availability of images of published articles via
83 See, e.g., F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Trans-
formed the Law, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 563, 598-600 (2002) (arguing that computer-aided legal
research has fundamentally transformed legal research); cf Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging
and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1071, 1087 (2006) (noting
that blogs may be viewed as shorter forms of legal scholarship). But cf Robert C. Berring,
Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 1673, 1696 (2000)
(arguing that Westlaw and Lexis did very little to change the practice of law).
84 See supra Part II.B.2.
85 See supra Part II.B.2.
86 For example, were judges a generation ago more homogenous in their use of legal
scholarship?
87 In a study of Supreme Court citations, one researcher noted that the two justices
who cited secondary sources most frequently, Brennan and Marshall, were on the liberal
wing of the Court, while Rehnquist and White, two of the most conservative justices on the
Court at that time, had among the lowest citation counts. See Wes Daniels, "Far Beyond the
Law Reports": Secondary Source Citations in United States Supreme Court Opinions October Terms
1900, 1940, and 1978, 76 LAw LIBR. J. 1, 10 tbl.6 (1983). But cf Sirico & Margulies, supra
note 13, at 134-35 (discounting the possibility that citation rate changes were due to
changes in justices on the Court).
88 Antonin Scalia, The Legacy ofJudge Howard T. Markey, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 8 (2009).
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HeinOnline. Another development that might encourage judicial use
of legal scholarship is the movement (or at least claim of preference)
by law reviews toward accepting and publishing shorter articles. A
possible effect of shorter articles is that scholarship may appear less
muddy (e.g., authors have to be more explicit about what their contri-
bution is89), and judges can consume it at lower cost than in the past.
Other developments in the form or styling of law review articles, like
the increased use of abstracts and other structural devices, might
make scholarship more accessible to judges.
Finally, this study has focused on citations in the judges' output-
legal opinions-not the mechanism by which citations of legal schol-
arship are introduced into the opinions. Numerous questions about
the mechanism remain. For example, to what extent are citations pro-
vided by the law clerks, the judges themselves, and the parties or their
counsel via the appellate briefs?
2. What Kind of Scholarship Do judges Use and How Do They Use
It ?9o
Much of the literature criticizing legal scholarship has been di-
rected at "Law and" types of scholarship. 91 But "Law and" scholarship
can be defended on the ground that it in fact aims to be more helpful
to judges (and others like legislators) than conventional forms of legal
scholarship. What kinds of legal scholarship do judges use? Does the
increase in use include a contribution from quality "Law and" scholar-
ship, or doctrinal work, purely normative rhetorical argument, or
other work seeking to interpret precedent or statutes by conventional
means? Analyzing the content of cited law review articles seems both
appropriate and possible.92
How do judges use legal scholarship? The results we present of-
fer evidence that judges use it more frequently, but our means of mea-
89 Cf Posner, supra note 2, at 1320-21 (criticizing legal scholarship for often not
clearly explaining what the author thinks an article adds to the established literature).
90 This category overlaps at least somewhat with the category What Variables Explain
judicial Use of Legal Scholarship?, supra Part II.C.1, in particular with the discussion about
whether there are qualities or characteristics of the form or presentation of legal
scholarship that encourage judges to use it.
91 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 2, at 34-35.
92 Others have attempted to categorize the judicially cited scholarship. See Alden et
al., supra note 13, at app.E (classifying scholarship cited in 1960, 1980, and 2000 as practi-
cal, theoretical, or mixed). The Association of American of Law Schools' conference for
new law teachers offers a description of legal scholarship that places legal scholarship into
nine distinct categories. See Martha Minow, Archetypal Legal Scholarship-A Field Guide
(June 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). To the extent that Minow's
description could be turned into a coding rubric, it might provide a fairly well-accepted
means of categorizing the articles cited in judicial opinions.
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surement is in reality quite crude.93 Moreover, citation to legal
scholarship, while a form of use, is not fully descriptive of the sub-
stance of the use. Do judges use scholarship in a robust way (e.g., by
analyzing and considering the arguments made or, in the case of em-
pirical work, critically examining the evidence and interpretations
that flow from the evidence, ultimately articulating how the analysis
impacts the decisional process)? Or do "[j]udges use [law review arti-
cles] like drunks use lampposts[:] more for support than for illumina-
tion"?94 This question, too, seems approachable through an analysis
of the content of opinions95 by, for example, scoring article content
against the judgment or scoring the signal used for the citation.
3. How Relevant Is Legal Scholarship, Really, to the Bench and Bar?
This category of future work seeks to address more of a metaques-
tion: is legal scholarship an institution of the legal system, or is it
merely an institution of the legal academy divorced or attenuated
from the legal system in some substantial way? Along these lines, the
results presented here show a skewed distribution of citation to legal
scholarship. The median amount of citations per judge-probably
the most accurate measure of central tendency given the context and
distribution-some might consider quite low. But is it?
How often should judges cite legal scholarship? Should every cir-
cuit level opinion reveal that judges considered legal scholarship in
the relevant area? Does legal scholarship have any role to play in the
day-to-day functioning of the legal system? These and other questions
are of tremendous interest, but will probably not be satisfactorily an-
swered until much additional work has been performed.
CONCLUSION
This Article reports a surprising and unexpected result. Over the
last fifty-nine years, there has been an increase in the frequency of
citation to legal scholarship in the reported opinions of the circuit
courts of appeals. The Article also offers empirical findings that sug-
gest some possible explanations for the observation, and which, more
generally, might help to explain why courts cite or do not cite to legal
scholarship. From these results, conclusions about the meaning of le-
gal scholarship to judges may be difficult to reach, but this Article
suggests a number of avenues for potentially fruitful future research.
93 As noted earlier, judges almost certainly use legal scholarship more often than they
cite it; determining when they use it without citation seems a daunting project.
94 See Liptak, supra note 5 (quoting Judge Robert D. Sack).
95 See, e.g., Gary Edmond & David Mercer, Conjectures and Exhumations: Citations of His-
tory, Philosophy and Sociology of Science in US Federal Courts, 14 LAw & LITERATURE 309 (2002)




VARIABLES EXPLAINING CITATION To LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
FROM 1990-200896
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
No. Appeals -5.52E-06 7.22E-07 1.57E-06
(2.04e-6)** (2.36e-6) (2.58e-6)
Opinions/Appeal -0.1448432 -0.0094185 -0.0174254
(0.0309878)*** (0.0319128) (0.0332398)
Reported -0.0020908 -0.0015677 -0.0018351
Opinions/Active Judge (0.0002531)*** (0.0003629)*** (.0003853)
JCS-Circuit Courts -0.0682374 -0.0534328 -0.0688984
(0.0144017)*** (0.024733)** (.0292029)*
JCS-Supreme Court 0.2668500 0.0273272 (omitted)
(0.0765675) (0.0622997)
No. Law Revs -0.0001006 -0.000034 -0.0000574
(0.0000935) (0.000082) (0.0000579)
Total Crim -0.0000256 -0.0000279 -0.00003
(0.0000125)* (0.0000112)** (.0000119)*
TotalConlaw 0.0000540 0.0004446 0.0006223
(0.0001517) (0.0002334)t (0.0002322)**
Circuit indicator x x
Year indicator x
Constant 0.5047385 0.3659536 0.3943835
(0.0599083) (0.0506173) (0.0353228)
R' 0.4521 0.7029 0.7326
96 The table in this Appendix reports three separate multiple regression models
examining the contribution of the explanatory variables to the proportion of reported
opinions citing legal scholarship from 1990 to 2008. As described earlier, see supra note 66,
No. Appeals measures the total number of appeals filed for the circuit; Opinions/Appeal
measures the number of opinions authored per appeal filed; Rep. Opinions/Active Judge
measures the number of reported opinions authored per active circuit judge; JCS-Circuit
Courts and JCS-Supreme Court refer to JCS scores for the regional circuits and for the
Supreme Court. For more on the JCS metric, see generally sources cited supra note 66.
No. LawRevs measures the number of law reviews in existence for each of the underlying
data points. TotalCrim measures the total number of reported and unreported criminal
appellate decisions for each data point. The Westlaw query "(TI("United States" "U.S.") &
(sentenc! guilt! convict! pled))" was used to gather information for the TotalCrim variable.
TotalConlaw measures the number of opinions involving a constitutional issue, as measured
using West's Headnotes (Topical Headnote 92) for each data point. Some variables
(including the dependent variable Reported Opinions Citing) were transformed to improve
normality. In addition, models 2 and 3 include dummy variables for either year (from
1990 until 1998) or circuit court. Superscripts report the relevant level of statistical
significance: variables which do not significantly predict the response variables (no
superscript), while others are predictors at a marginal level of significance (t), p 5 0.1; at
the conventional definition of significance (*), p 5 0.05; at higher level of significance (**),
p 5 0.01; and at an even higher level of significance (***), p 0.001. This table includes
data from all regional federal circuits, but not data from the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit because we were unable to obtain data for some of the explanatory
variables for that circuit. The models were created using Stata.
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